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I. THE U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL 
A. Agency Theory for Public U.S. Corporations 
The essence of corporate governance in U.S. public corporations lies in 
the separation of ownership and control.1  Given the dispersed capital 
  
 * Lecturer, Guanghua Law School, Zhejiang University.  J.D., Cornell Law 
School. LL.M., Harvard Law School. LL.B., Zhejiang University.  My thanks to the editors 
and staff of the Michigan State Journal of International Law for their valuable editing of the 
article.  I gratefully acknowledge financial support provided by the Department of Education 
of Zhejiang Province (Grant No. Y200906638) and by the Special Research Fund for the 
“Morning Star Project” through Faculty of Social Sciences, Zhejiang University. 
 1. See, e.g., ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1932); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
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structure, there are usually collective action problem in a public corporation: 
shareholders typically have neither sufficient knowledge nor enough 
incentive to participate in the management of the corporation due to their 
relatively small stake in the corporation and the significant transaction costs 
of coordination.2  Therefore, it is more efficient—even necessary in most 
cases—for experienced professionals to manage the corporation.3  The 
agency theory assumes that human behavior is opportunistic in nature.4  
Inevitably there are certain situations where the managers’ personal interest 
is in conflict with the shareholders’ interest, and the managers will be 
tempted to act opportunistically.  This is one of the costs of agency imposed 
on the shareholders.5  Hence, ways to minimize agency costs have become 
one of the foci of the debate on corporate governance.6  In order to solve the 
collective action problem, there are both monitoring and exit mechanisms in 
a public corporation.  Corporate laws impose fiduciary duties on the board 
of directors to perform conflict monitoring to reduce agency costs.7  There 
are multiple regulations that seek to address this problem.8  In addition, free 
transferability of stocks and various types of markets allow the shareholders 
to “vote with their feet.”9  There are many other supporting rules such as 
  
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305 (1976). 
 2. See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (1986); Douglas Litowitz, Are 
Corporations Evil?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811 (2004); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching 
Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 813 (1992). 
 3. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW chs. 14–15 (7th ed. 2007).  
 4. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the 
Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1433 (1985); Kenneth E. Scott, Agency Costs 
and Corporate Governance, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE 
LAW 26 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 5. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 310 (listing the agency costs as the sum of 
the monitoring expenditures of the principal, the bonding expenditures by the agent, and the 
residual loss); see also Lynne L. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards of 
Directors: The Dual Board and Board Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91 (1997). 
 6. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 4; Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1459 (2005); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why 
Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005); Michael B. Dorff, 
Does One Hand Wash The Other?: Testing the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting 
Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 255 (2005); Scott, supra note 4, at 26. 
 7. See, e.g., CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND 
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 221–380 (2003).  
 8. Robert E. Bostrom has listed multiple regulation bodies such as U.S. Department 
of Justice Sentencing Guidelines, Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Section 404), NYSE Listing 
Standards, Proposed Draft COSO Framework for Enterprise-wide Risk Management, and 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Audit Standard No. 2 regarding outside 
auditor review of internal controls.  See Robert E. Bostrom, Compliance, Risk Management 
and Internal Controls: A Checklist for Corporate Counsel — Part I, 2004 METROPOLITAN 
CORP. COUNS. 18; Robert E. Bostrom, Compliance, Risk Management and Internal Controls: 
A Checklist for Corporate Counsel — Part II, 2004 METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS. 21. 
 9. See, e.g., Harry G. Hutchison & R. Sean Alley, The High Costs of Shareholder 
Participation, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 964 (2009); Arthur R. Pinto, Section III: Corporate 
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disclosure requirements, to assure that the shareholders can make decisions 
on an informed basis.10  
B. The Heightened Standard on Independent Director 
As an integral part of the monitoring mechanism in a corporation, the 
institution of independent director originates from the idea of supervising 
management’s performance in order to maximize the shareholders’ 
interests.11 
Under the U.S. system of federalism, there are federal law requirements 
and state law requirements on independent directors.12  Under certain state 
laws, some committees consisting of independent directors are particularly 
helpful in the handling of corporate reorganizations and derivative 
litigations.13  For instance, under Delaware corporate law, a majority of 
independent directors on a board can help the board obtain the business 
judgment rule presumption in a two-step tender offer where a heightened 
standard is usually imposed.14  In contrast, the standard on independent 
directors in Michigan corporate laws is higher.15  However, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”) has significantly changed the 
boundary between federal securities laws and state corporations law on 
corporate governance.16  Federal laws impose higher standards with respect 
  
Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in American Corporations, 46 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 317 (1998); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 
675, 716 (2007). 
 10. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, 
and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394 (2004); John F. Olson, Looking Beyond the Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis: A Comment on Professor Macey’s Post-Enron Analysis, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 527 (2004).  
 11. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Protemkin 
Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 599 (1982). 
 12. See Dallas, supra note 5, at 92 (providing a detailed study on the evolution of 
corporate governance practice with the focus of attention on boards of directors).  In 
addition, as corporation laws are generally under state jurisdiction, the standard on 
independent directors may vary from state to state. 
 13. See Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Renee M. Jones, 
Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625 (2004).  
In addition, the use of a committee of independent directors can effectively shift the burden 
of persuasion, which to some extent is outcome determinative.  See Shaunna L. Wolpert, In 
re JCC Holding Co., Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 257 (2004). 
 14. See In re Pure Resources, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 
2002).  
 15. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1107(3)(b)–(c) (West 2002); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 450.1107(3)(d)(i)–(iii) (West 2002). 
 16. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas: The 
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 79, 79 (2005); Jonathan H. Gabriel, Note, Misdirected?: Potential Issues with 
Reliance on Independent Directors for Prevention of Corporate Fraud, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 641 (2005). 
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to independent directors.17  One of the reasons for the enhanced standard 
derives from the backlash against a series of corporate scandals in the 
United States.18  However, as might be expected, the new rules received 
mixed reactions from both practitioners and corporate legal scholars.19  
An institution should be tested both by theories and by empirical 
research.  The institution of independent directors is no exception.  The 
theoretical economic model demonstrates that the institution of independent 
director is efficient if appropriate incentive and constraint mechanisms are 
structured.20  However, the “power coalition theory” provides another 
perspective, because the theory posits that a board performs relational 
functions,21 which is as important as the conflict monitoring function.  In a 
word, there is by no means a consistent theoretical analysis of this 
institution in academia.22 
As might be expected, the empirical findings on the correlation between 
the board composition and company performance are inconsistent.  The 
differences may come from the different assumptions and/or different 
statistical methodology.  For instance, based on a sample of 154 large 
publicly traded domestic corporations, Ira M. Millstein and Paul W. 
  
 17. See, e.g., Holly Gregory, Comparison of Sarbanes Oxley, SEC and Listing Rule 
Provisions Related to the Composition and Functioning of the Board of Directors of a 
Publicly Traded Company, in DIRECTORS’ INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (6th ed., 
2008). 
 18. See, e.g., James Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable: The Adequacy of Risk 
Management in Finance and Environmental Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 731 (2009); 
14 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 6831.70 (perm. ed. 2003 & Supp. 2010); James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, 
Construction and Application of Whistleblower Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a)(1), 15 A.L.R. FED. 315 (2006).  
 19. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate 
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002); Michael J. 
Borden, The Role of Financial Journalists in Corporate Governance, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L. 311 (2007). 
 20. See, e.g., ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
GAME THEORY 159–290 (2001) (introducing several models such as monitoring, tournaments, 
risk-sharing, and billing-in-oil, etc.). 
 21.  See Dallas, supra note 5, at 95. 
 [T]he board provides the corporation with relational resources that decrease the 
corporation’s uncertainty and enhance its chances of survival.  These resources 
include coordination with the external environment, information access and 
exchange, support of corporate business, advice on various subjects, legitimacy 
and status in the eyes of relevant communities, monitoring, and control.  Under 
this theory, functions of boards in addition to conflicts monitoring are 
economically significant.  Independent directors, however, may not always be in 
a position to provide all of these resources. 
Id. 
 22. See, e.g., Seth W. Ashby, Note, Strengthening the Public Company Board of Directors: 
Limited Shareholder Access to the Corporate Ballot vs. Required Majority Board Independence, 2005 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 521 (2005); Oliver Krackhardt, New Rules for Corporate Governance in the United States 
and Germany: A Model for New Zealand?, 36 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 319 (2005). 
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MacAvoy found that the corporations with active and independent boards 
performed much better than those with passive boards.23  In contrast, some 
empirical studies demonstrate that some corporations by increasing the 
independence of their boards of directors do not necessarily enhance the 
corporations’ performances.24  Moreover, some commentators found that 
the “one size fits all approach” is inefficient and impractical per se.25 
However, some empirical studies provide different assessments of the 
importance of directorial independence by criticizing the aforementioned 
empirical studies.  “Power coalition theory” is one of them.  They are of the 
opinion that as some non-independent directors may be in a better position 
to perform the relational functions than independent directors, it is 
erroneous to attribute the overall corporate performance merely to the level 
of directorial independence.26  Accordingly, they find the positive 
correlation between the directorial independence and the effectiveness of 
the conflict monitoring of the companies.27  This Article tends to agree with 
the last theory because in reality, there are different types of directors who 
play different roles in a corporation.  Barry D. Baysinger and Henry N. 
Butler have nicely categorized the directors’ functions into three types: 
executive, instrumental, and monitoring.28  Therefore, it seems that there are 
at least two possible options for establishing corporate governance structure: 
one is to have a unitary board to perform all these functions, or the other is 
to divide the board and have different directors perform distinct functions.  
In reality, U.S. corporate law adopted a pragmatic approach in which 
different committees are to be established on an ad-hoc basis.  In this way, 
  
 23. This empirical study not only compared “independence” of the boards, but also 
the “activeness” of the boards, and thus to some extent diluted the positive contribution by 
“directorial independence” to the superior performance of those companies.  See Ira M. 
Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of the 
Largest Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283 (1998). 
 24. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board 
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002); see also Lisa M. 
Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director?: Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through 
Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393 (2005); Ribstein, supra note 19. 
 25. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s Director 
Independence Listing Standards, 30 SEC. REG. L.J. 370, 372 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1034, 1065 (1993).  
 26. Dallas, supra note 5, at 112. 
 27. See, e.g., Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. 
FIN. ECON. 431, 432 (1988). 
 28. “Executive function” generally means ordinary administrative work.   
“Instrumental function” includes providing business and/or legal advice.  “Monitoring 
function” focuses on supervising management and conflict checking.  See Barry D. 
Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: 
Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101, 109–10 
(1985). 
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U.S. corporate law intends to separate management from supervision while 
maintaining certain flexibilities.  
II.  GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL 
A. The Dual-Board Institution in German Corporations 
The cornerstone of German corporate governance is its dual-board 
institution in a corporation.  Under that governance structure, the 
management board (“Vorstand”) and supervisory council (“Aufsichtsrat”) 
perform different functions.  Furthermore, the members of one body are 
strictly prohibited to be in the other body.  The management board assumes 
the responsibility for directing corporate activities, while the supervisory 
council has the power to appoint, dismiss and supervise the management 
board.  In addition, the supervisory council assumes the responsibility for 
examining the corporation’s financial records.29 
B. Separation of Management and Supervision 
The major goal of the dual-board institution is to separate the 
responsibility for monitoring from the actual managing of the corporation.30  
Noticeably, some commentators argue that there is convergence between 
German corporations and U.S. corporations in terms of the separation of 
management and supervision:31 in a German corporation, the management 
power and supervision power is allocated between the management board 
and supervisory council;32 and in a U.S. corporation, the management power 
and supervision power is allocated between the executive officers and the 
unitary board of directors.33  Also, the increasing number of independent 
directors on boards in U.S. corporations would suggest convergence in that 
their role of a supervisor is becoming more preponderant.  Nonetheless, the 
German approach is more rigid, because the members of each body are 
strictly prohibited from serving on the other body. 
  
 29. See generally, MASAHIKO AOKI, THE CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM 
(1984); JEAN DU PLESSIS ET AL., GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
EUROPEAN CONTEXT 203 (2007).  
 30. See AOKI, supra note 29, at 156–57; Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models of Modern 
Corporations: A Comparative Analysis of German and U.S. Corporate Structures, 17 ARIZ. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 555, 561 (2000); Thomas J. Andre, Cultural Hegemony: The Exportation 
of Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance Ideologies to Germany, 73 TUL. L. REV. 69, 84 
(1998). 
 31. Dallas, supra note 5, at 141. 
 32. Michael E. Murphy, The Nominating Process for Corporate Boards of Directors: 
A Decision-Making Analysis, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 131, 189 (2008).  
 33. See Dallas, supra note 5, at 138. 
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III. PRACTICAL REASONS FOR DIVERGENT GOVERNANCE MODELS 
Board composition is a vital part of corporate governance.34  The 
distinct board composition depends on the other constituents of the overall 
regulatory regime and the capital markets.35  
A. Divergent Objectives 
Corporate governance is an instrument by which a country achieves its 
objective vis-à-vis corporations.  The major goal of a typical U.S. 
corporation is to maximize shareholders’ interests, although there are some 
debates over the tension between the interests of other constituents and 
shareholders’ interests in certain situations.36  
In contrast, the German dual-board structure is based on the concept of 
co-determination.37  According to this theory, labor and capital co-determine 
a corporation’s activities, so accordingly labor is given certain influence in 
management through participation in the process of selecting management.38  
B. Litigation Devices Regarding Directors’ Liabilities 
Procedural devices can reinforce substantive rights.  In the United States, 
shareholders may bring direct, derivative, and class action lawsuits under 
  
 34. See, e.g., Baysinger & Butler, supra note 28; JOHN H. FARRAR, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: THEORIES, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICE (2005).  
 35. See, e.g., FARRAR, supra note 34; Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity 
Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333 (2009); Marc Goldstein, 
Mitigating Dysfunctional Deference Through Improvements in Board Composition and 
Board Effectiveness, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 490, 491–92 (2009). 
 36. See, e.g., In re Global Service Group, LLC, 316 B.R. 451, 460 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., 
2004) (“once insolvency ensues, the fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors also 
extend to creditors.  As a result, the officers and directors owe duties to multiple 
constituencies whose interests may diverge.”); see also, Lynda J. Oswald, Shareholders v. 
Stakeholders: Evaluating Corporate Constituency Statutes Under the Takings Clause, 24 J. 
CORP. L. 1, 2 (1998); Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes 
and False Fears, 1999 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85; Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: 
Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14 (1992); Rima 
Fawal Hartman, Situation-Specific Fiduciary Duties for Corporate Directors: Enforceable 
Obligations or Toothless Ideals?, 50 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1761 (1993). 
 37. See Mark J. Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Market, 1998 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 167, 170; Bernd Singhof & Oliver Seiler, Shareholder Participation in 
Corporate Decision-Making Under German Law: A Comparative Analysis, 24 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 493, 537 & n.166 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various 
Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary 
Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991).  
 38. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 37, at 172; Butler, supra note 30, at 561–63; Detlev F. 
Vagts, Reforming the Modern Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 23 (1966); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical 
Dimension of Global Corporate Governance, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1141 (1999); AOKI, 
supra note 29, at 170. 
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both federal laws and state laws.39  In addition, there is a group of lawyers 
who are specialized in advocating these types of suits.40  In contrast, in 
Germany, usually neither derivative suits nor class action suits are 
allowed.41  A theoretical explanation is that the rigid separation of 
management and supervision in the German corporations eliminates the 
need for such litigation devices.  However, it is far from settled whether the 
supervisory council or shareholders are in a better position to monitor 
management.42 
C. Role of Banks and other Institutional Investors 
In Germany, banks play an essential role in the corporate governance.43  
Banks are the embodiment of shareholder and debt holder power and have a 
significant influence on the governance mechanism.  In addition, there is no 
division between commercial banks and investment banks in Germany.44  In 
contrast, in the United States, the Glass-Steagal Act separates commercial 
banks from investment banks, and prohibits commercial banks from 
conducting investment business.45  Additionally, vis-à-vis the banks in 
Germany, U.S. banks do not have such a dominant influence on corporate 
governance.46  However, there are certain institutional investors who have 
been pressing the SEC to perform more “watching” functions and exert 
more influence.  Nonetheless, the desirability of having institutional 
investors supervise managers is still debatable47 and their influence on 
corporate governance is still limited by the collective action problem.48 
  
 39. See, e.g., Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of 
Shareholder Litigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 75 (2008); Robert B. Thompson & Randall 
S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 133 (2004). 
 40. See, e.g., Thompson & Thomas, supra note 39; Daniel R. Fischel & Michael 
Bradley, The Role Of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1986); Cunningham, supra 
note 28, at 1138. 
 41. See Cunningham, supra note 28, at 1186;  but see Fischel & Bradley, supra note 
40, at 286–87 (reasoning that the most likely explanation for the survival of the derivative 
suit is its role in deterring large one-shot frauds such as a decision to destroy all of a firm’s 
assets in response to a hostile takeover attempt). 
 42. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 30, at 602. 
 43. See generally AOKI, supra note 29; Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Some Reflections on 
German Corporate Governance: A Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards, 70 TUL. L. REV. 
1819 (1996); Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation for the 
Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 513 (1993). 
 44. See, e.g., Mark E. Nance & Bernd Singhof, Banking’s Influence over Non-Bank 
Companies After Glass-Steagall: A German Universal Comparison, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
1305, 1306–07 (2000). 
 45. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).  
 46. Cunningham, supra note 38, at 1139–40. 
 47. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of 
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 841 (1992); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier 
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D. Capital Market as a Check 
The capital market functions as a check on the management of a 
corporation.49  The ability to sell is a significant “stick” in the bundle of 
rights that the shareholders enjoy in a U.S. public corporation.50  There are 
public markets available where free transferability is allowed and 
conducted.  In addition, during tender offers, shareholders are able to tender 
their shares for a premium and might consequently allow the raider to take 
over the management.  This is arguably an incentive mechanism to optimize 
management.51 
IV. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THE DIVERGENCE OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
Theoretical rationales are needed not only in explaining the divergence, 
but also in prescribing appropriate normative suggestions for reform. 
A. Theory of Path Dependence 
Professor Lucian Bebchuk and Mark Roe have proposed the “path 
dependence theory” in corporate ownership, the theory that corporate law 
structure depends on the structures with which the economy was started.  In 
addition, corporate rules, which affect ownership structures, will themselves 
depend on the corporate structures with which the economy was started.52  
  
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Directors: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 863, 866 (1991); Mark J. Roe, Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, 
Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1931–32 (1993); Jeffery N. Gordon, 
Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 
U. CIN. L. REV. 347 (1991); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of 
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L. J. 445 (1991). 
 48. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 30. 
 49. See Estreicher, supra note 43. 
 50. See generally Pinto, supra note 9. 
 51. For the discussions of the management-related dynamics in tender-offers, see for 
example, John C. Coffee Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical 
Assessment of the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 
(1984); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 
YALE L.J. 698 (1982); Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 21–22, 41 (1988); CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (Alan 
J. Auerbach ed., 1988); Christian Kirchner & Richard W. Painter, Takeover Defenses Under 
Delaware Law, the Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and the New German Takeover Law, 
50 AM. J. COMP. L. 451 (2002); Gregory R. Andre, Tender Offers for Corporate Control: A 
Critical Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865 (1987); Ronald J. 
Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in 
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981).   
 52. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in 
Corporate Governance and Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 127 (1999); cf. S. J. Liebowitz 
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This theory certainly shed some light on the persistence of the different 
forms of corporate governance in advanced economies.53  Furthermore, the 
path dependence theory serves a normative function as it may be utilized to 
predict the future of a nation’s corporate governance structure.54  In light of 
the “path dependence theory,” U.S. hostility towards excessive wealth 
accumulation and other inherent cultural endowment effects prevent U.S. 
corporations from replacing the U.S. corporate governance model with the 
German model. 55  On the other hand, the existence of the dual-board system 
and the significant participation of labor render it much less feasible for 
German corporate governance to switch to the U.S. model.56 
B. Economic Development and Legal Infrastructure 
The development of legal infrastructure is the means through which to 
achieve economic development.57  In turn, economic development can 
facilitate advancement in the legal infrastructure.58  The costs of legal 
reform in civil law countries and common law countries are different in 
both form and quantity.59  Judge Posner insightfully recognizes the 
fundamental tradeoff between making an investment in developing rules 
and in the judiciary.60 Accordingly, he argues that enacting comprehensive 
  
& Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 
205–06 (1995) (challenging path-dependence theory). 
 53. See, e.g., Helmut Kohl, Corporate Governance: Path Dependence and German 
Corporate Law: Some Skeptical Remarks from the Sideline, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 189 (1999); 
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing 
Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 361 (1996); Oona A. 
Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a 
Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001); Richard A. Posner, Path-Dependency, 
Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 573 (2000); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 641 (1996).   
 54. See Roe, supra note 53. 
 55. Edward S. Adams, Corporate Governance After Enron and Global Crossing: 
Comparative Lessons for Cross-National Improvement, 78 IND. L. J. 723, 764–65 (2003); 
Hathaway, supra note 53. 
 56. See Andre, supra note 30, at 105, 107; see also Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 52, 
at 150. 
 57. There have been significant researches on the relationship between legal 
infrastructure and economic development, see for example, Daniel M. Klerman, Legal 
Infrastructure, Judicial Independence, and Economic Development, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE 
GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 427 (2007); Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic 
Development?: Evidence from East Asia, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 829 (2000); Gerald M. 
Meier, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, 21 STAN. L. REV. 962 (1969) 
(book review); Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey 
of the Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117 (1999). 
 58. See generally Messick, supra note 57. 
 59. See generally Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic 
Development, 13 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1 (1998); Hathaway, supra note 53. 
 60. See Posner, supra note 59, at 7. 
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rules is more efficient than cultivating a sophisticated judiciary for a 
developing nation.61 
V.  STATUS QUO OF CHINESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
SUGGESTIONS 
A. Importance of Independent Directors in China 
In 1978, China began a major program of economic reform.62  It is no 
accident that the period of reform has coincided with the period of 
“legalization”: the effort by the government to enhance the role of law and 
legal institutions in Chinese society.  China started to operate securities 
markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen for several reasons, including, inter alia, 
attracting investment and promoting the reorganization of state owned 
enterprises.63 
Adequate protection for public shareholders is critical for the 
development of a capital market.64  However, there is insufficient protection 
for public shareholders of the listed companies in China due to the 
inadequate capital market control and the inefficient monitoring system.  In 
many listed companies, controlling shareholders dominate the nomination 
and appointment of the directors.65  Hence, a robust supervisory body is 
needed urgently. 
  
 61. See id. 
 62. For discussions on China’s economic reform, see for example, Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Keynote Address, Whither Reform?: Ten Years of the Transition, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK 
CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1999 27 (Boris Pleskovic & Joseph E. Stiglitz 
eds., 2000); Lawrence J. Lau et al., Reform Without Losers: An Interpretation of China’s 
Dual-Track Approach to Transition,  108 J. POL. ECON. 120 (2000); Yingyi Qian, The 
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 63. For an overview of the development of securities markets in China, see Yuwa 
Wei, The Development of the Securities Market and Regulation in China, 27 LOY. L.A. INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 479 (2005). 
 64. See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate 
Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000). 
 65. Some scholars describe these listed companies as “so-called public companies,” 
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domineering position of state shares. Although there are the shareholders’ meeting, 
board meeting and supervisory board meeting, the result is that the shareholders’ 
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B. Status Quo of the Corporate Governance in China 
Although it is not required to have a supervisory board in a listed 
company, there is usually a supervisory board that consists of shareholder 
representatives and an employee representative in a listed company in 
China.66  Theoretically, the supervisory board has significant power to 
supervise directors, examine financial documents, and convene shareholder 
meetings.67  However, in practice the supervisory board has not functioned 
effectively because it does not have genuine power to select or discipline 
directors and managers.68  Furthermore, there is some overlap between the 
function of the supervisory board and the board of directors.69 
For various reasons, the China Securities Regulatory Commission in 
2001 issued the landmark guiding opinion establishing the independent 
director institution in China, under which a minimum of one-third of each 
listed company’s board members must be independent by June 30, 2003.70  
In some sense, the introduction of the independent director institution 
implies the ineffectiveness of the supervisory board in those listed 
  
meeting has become controlling shareholders’ meeting; board meeting has become 
executive board meeting of controlling shareholders; and supervisory meeting has 
become supervisory meeting of the board. The meetings exist in form only. Such 
governance structure has further evolved into dominance of one share, which is 
unique in China. 
Jipeng Liu, Independent Directors System in Modern Corporate Governance Structure, ¶ 4, 
available at http://www.cipe.org/regional/asia/china/independent.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 
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DEL. J. CORP. L. 125 (2006). 
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Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), available at 
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 68. See, e.g., Yuan, supra note 65; Yuwa Wei, Volatility of China’s Securities 
Markets and Corporate Governance, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 207 (2006). 
 69. See Thomas W. Lin, Corporate Governance in China: Recent Developments, 
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 70. See Sibao Shen & Jing Jia, Will the Independent Director Institution Work in 
China, 27 LOY. L. A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 223, 223 (2005).  One of the reasons for 
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companies.71  Actually, the previous circulars on independent directors were 
only recommendations; thus it was optional for the companies themselves to 
decide whether or not to adopt them.72  However, since the 2001 guiding 
opinion, these requirements become mandatory for the listed companies.73 
Consistent with the motivation of establishing mandatory requirements 
on independent directors, they are expected to effectively monitor 
management, conduct conflict checking, and safeguard the interests of 
minority shareholders.74 
Although it is acknowledged that independent directors could be an 
efficient institution for reducing the likelihood of opportunistic behaviors, 
under China’s current corporate law regime, there are some inherent 
problems related to it.  Generally speaking, these problems can be 
categorized into two types.  The first type of problem is deals with the 
relationship between independent directors and the supervisory board. 
(“Incompatibility” problem).  The second type of problem is the intrinsic 
defects of the independent director institution as a supervising body 
(“Intrinsic” problem).  
Although some commentators argue that the monitoring role of 
independent directors is different from the supervisory board,75 and hence 
there is no conflict between the two bodies,76 as a matter of fact, there are 
overlaps between the functions of the two bodies.  This certainly increases 
transaction costs.  As suggested by Professor Eric Kades, if there are 
inherent conflicting interests between a supervisory board and independent 
directors, the efforts of creating incentives to encourage cooperation 
between the two bodies are likely to be futile.  Therefore, there are at least 
two possible options.  The first option is to dispense with the supervisory 
board in a corporation.  This could thoroughly eliminate the inherent 
conflicts between the two bodies.  The second option is for laws and 
regulations to allocate and separate clearly the powers of supervisors and 
directors.77  If the second option is adopted, there would be more inherent 
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“incompatibility” problems. First, who is going to supervise whom?78  
Second, how will possible collusion between the two bodies be effectively 
prevented?79  Given the path-dependent concerns, although the first option 
seems more direct, the second option is more reasonable because there are 
considerable advantages in maintaining the supervisory body through which 
the employee may participate in management.  Some scholars argue that 
employees’ participation in the corporate governance may reduce the 
information asymmetry that threatens a trade-off between their commitment 
(to make firm-specific human capital investment) and adaptability (to meet 
technological changes and organization restructure).80  Furthermore, the 
Chinese government might still rely on those listed companies (restructured 
state owned enterprises) to provide social security and welfare to the 
workers.81 
Additionally, independent directors as a supervisory body have various 
intrinsic defects as well.  There is always a tradeoff between the insiders’ 
knowledge and the outsiders’ independence.  Usually the outside directors 
are from academia and normally they have other employment obligations.  
Hence, many independent directors neither have sufficient information nor 
the incentive to provide substantial supervision.  The lack of a reasonable 
process of selection is another intrinsic problem.82 
C. Suggestions on Reform 
Many people who are about to make suggestions on changes might find 
themselves in a dilemma of being too “idealistic” or too “realistic.”  This 
dilemma is vividly elaborated by Professor Radin: on one hand, if one 
compromises too much, one may reinforce the status quo instead of making 
any progress; on the other hand, if one is too utopian about the ideals, one 
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may make no progress either.83  A middle way might be a sensible 
compromise.  Generally speaking, in terms of developing a suitable 
corporate governance model for China, both the long-term objectives and 
short-term goals shall be considered.  In addition, a combination of 
regulatory measures and market forces should participate in the reform.  
Accordingly, the reform shall have both top-down and bottom-up elements. 
In order to eliminate the inherent conflicting interest between the 
supervisory board and independent directors, the most direct way is to 
consolidate the two supervising bodies into one.  However, path-
dependence theory predicts that this is very unlikely to happen.  An 
additional cost would be the sacrifice of the employees’ participation in the 
management.  Therefore, we have to turn to more realistic alternatives.  
One option is to establish the hierarchical model between independent 
directors and the supervisory board,84 although in the two-level supervising 
arrangement, the cost of supervising might be higher vis-à-vis consolidating 
two supervising bodies into one.  With the development of a capital market, 
China might gradually be able to rely more on the market to reach the 
optimal corporate governance.  Under this hypothesis, the legislature may 
amend the company law, making the current mandatory requirements on 
independent directors optional.  If the institution of independent directors 
can help the listed companies improve performance, it is expected that those 
corporations will opt to increase the percentage of independent directors on 
the board of directors. 
VI. AN INCONCLUSIVE CONCLUSION 
As supported by the path dependence theory, different nations use 
different ways (such as the German dual-board mechanism and the U.S. 
independent director requirement)85 to separate management functions from 
supervisory functions to better serve a nation’s goals for corporate law.  
Different development paths might lead to different outcomes.86  China 
has introduced the institution of independent directors with the hope of 
enhancing its corporate governance.  However, the independent director 
institution is by no means a sufficient condition for the development of 
corporate governance.87  Therefore, it is both unreasonable and unrealistic to 
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pin all hopes on independent directors to solve all the problems.  Rather, 
legal reform is like a comprehensive engineering project that has various 
dimensions, including both top-down reform and bottom-up development.88  
Its effectiveness also depends on a developed market and a fine corporate 
governance culture.89  Moreover, legal reform is a process.  Furthermore, as 
argued and expected by some scholars and practitioners, there would be 
sufficient incentive to push for the reform continuously.90   
In light of the special concerns of an economy in a transition period, 
carrying out government imposed reform through regulatory bodies is more 
efficient than cultivating a sophisticated judiciary.91  In some aspects of 
corporate governance, it is more efficient to have some mandatory rules to 
be enforced by a strong regulatory body than to adopt the Delaware laws 
and invest in training the judges.  The introduction of independent directors 
is a reasonable try.  Although enough time should be provided in order to 
test the worthiness of the introduction of the institution, if it is proved that 
the institution of independent directors has not played the role as expected 
and will not be capable of functioning well, or that it will be too costly to do 
so, other more efficient alternatives should be considered.  However, other 
bottom-up reforms are also necessary.  As reminded by Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
the foundations of a market economy, institutional and legal infrastructure, 
should not be underestimated.92  Therefore, it is advisable to bear in mind 
that establishing an appropriate corporate governance arrangement is a 
comprehensive project.93  
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